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Abstract Memory formation is a complex and very dynam-
ic process. After a learning event, the acquired information
undergoes a number of changes that eventually result in
memory storage. Stored memories are very malleable.
Recent rediscoveries show that after reactivation, for
example by retrieval, an established memory can become
transiently sensitive to disruption and needs to undergo a
process of restabilization, known as reconsolidation, to be
maintained. The findings that stabilized memories can
become labile have challenged the classical view of how
memories are consolidated over time and stored. On the
other hand, the reconsolidation process is not fully under-
stood, and theories about the nature and function of memory
reconsolidation remain controversial. In this paper, I will
present my view on some of the controversial issues of
memory reconsolidation and propose a hypothetical model
for how this process contributes to memory stabilization.
The debated issues that will be discussed are: (1) The term
reconsolidation; (2) Temporal constraints of memory recon-
solidation; (3) Classical theory of memory consolidation
versus theory of memory reconsolidation; (4) Procedural
constraints: what is it that needs to be reactivated to produce
memory fragility? (5) Functions of memory reconsolidation;
(6) Disrupting reconsolidation: an impairment of memory
stabilization or retrieval?
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The process of transforming newly learned information into
long-lasting memory has been the object of interest of many
scientists throughout the last century [1–4]. Studies of verbal
learning and trauma-induced retrograde amnesia in humans
that began more than 100 years ago lead to the idea that
memories become long-lasting through a process of
“consolidation” [5]. Over the last century, this process has
been extensively investigated behaviorally, pharmacologi-
cally, and molecularly in many species, including humans.
The conclusion drawn from these studies indicated that
consolidation is an evolutionarily conserved process of
memory formation that requires an initial phase of RNA
and protein synthesis [1–4, 6–8].
The classical view proposes that memory consolidation
is a unitary process through which a newly formed memory,
which is initially sensitive to disruption, becomes stable
over time; once stabilized, the memory remains insensitive
to disruption. Disrupting events include brain trauma,
seizure, electroconvulsive shock (ECS), brain cooling,
new learning, and the administration of drugs such as
inhibitors of protein and RNA synthesis.
In conflict with this view, recent results, extending
earlier observations, show that after reaching a “stable”
state, memory can become transiently labile again if
reactivated, for example, by recall [9–12]. Events able to
disrupt a reactivated memory are the same as those found to
be effective in disrupting consolidation including treatments
that inhibit molecular mechanisms or protein synthesis in
general. The process by which a labile memory again
becomes stable and therefore insensitive to disruption has
been termed reconsolidation, reminiscent of the labile
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phase of the posttraining consolidation process. Thus, it has
been proposed that, in contrast to what was hypothesized by
the classical theory of consolidation, when a memory is
recalled or reactivated it undergoes a reconsolidation process
that again stabilizes the labile memory [9, 13, 14].
Before discussing specific controversial issues between
the two views, I would like to point out that, in my opinion,
several disputes originate from confusion surrounding the
use of the term consolidation. With the explosion of
molecular studies, the term consolidation has often been
used to refer to the early requisite phases of transcription
and translation, implying that, once it has past, the protein
synthesis-dependent phase, a memory is “consolidated.”
However, earlier findings indicated that other manipulations
that affect the physiological activity of brain areas or
system networks, such as hippocampal inactivation, lesion,
or ablation, can affect the stability of memory for periods of
time that long exceed the initial phase of gene expression,
lasting for weeks in rodents and years in humans [15–20].
Hence, there are questions that need to be addressed in
relation to the temporal delimitation of memory consolida-
tion. Are we looking at distinct consolidation processes or
phases when we use different interference approaches?
When does the posttraining consolidation process end? Can
we identify experimental parameters that can define and
temporally delimit the process of memory consolidation? It
seems reasonable to believe that, indeed, different interfering
manipulations target different phases or perhaps different
stages of memory consolidation. In fact, the same memory
would be considered consolidated in studies that use protein
synthesis inhibitors, but still unconsolidated in investigations
that assess, for example, its hippocampal dependence.
This discrepancy could be explained, for example, by the
fact that a transient blockade of protein synthesis may not
affect phases of memory stabilization utilizing the activity
or functions of a neuronal network supported by an existing
large pool of proteins or proteins that have a long half-life.
A similar interpretation has recently been offered by Paul
Gold [21] in his insightful review, which summarizes and
discusses the field of retrograde amnesia. He states that
“retrograde amnesia gradients do not reveal time courses of
memory processes.” In summary, I believe that ambiguities
about how we in the field define the posttraining consol-
idation process reflect, in large part, the different results and
conclusions emerging from studies that used different
amnestic treatments.
Reconsolidation Despite the semantic debate about consol-
idation and reconsolidation, several studies of the last few
years have demonstrated that reconsolidation only partially
recapitulates the anatomical, pharmacological, and molec-
ular substrates of consolidation [11, 12, 22]. One study also
reported the existence of molecular signatures that doubly
dissociate the two processes [23]. Extensive reports and
discussions regarding this topic have been provided in
previous reviews [11, 12, 24, 25]. The general conclusions,
with which I agree, seem to argue that reconsolidation is
not a re-consolidation, and, it is now generally accepted
that the term reconsolidation is used not to mean faithful
repetition of the initial posttraining consolidation, but rather
the functional outcome of the process, which is to make
memory stable again.
Temporal constraints The hypothesis that whenever a
memory is retrieved or reactivated it again becomes labile
and “disruptable” [9, 10, 24] has been challenged. Studies
from my laboratory, as well as those of several others, have
pointed out that the passage of time is a limiting factor for
the postretrieval vulnerability of memory. Using the fear-
conditioning-based task inhibitory avoidance, we have
found that systemic inhibition of protein synthesis resulted
in decrementally graded amnesia of 2-day- and 1-week-old
memories while leaving intact 2-week- and 4-week-old
memories [26]. We recently confirmed these results using
bilateral amygdala injections of either the protein synthesis
inhibitor anysomycin or antisense DNA sequences specific
for the transcription factor CCAAT enhancer binding
protein β (C/EBPβ) (27; Milekic et al., unpublished). We
conclude that upon reactivation, an older memory does not
become fragile to the same degree as a young one does, and
that, over time, memory becomes increasingly stable and
insensitive to the postreactivation interference. Based on
this, I would like to argue that the reconsolidation
phenomenon reflects a fragile state of a memory that has
not yet been fully consolidated, although it has passed the
initial protein synthesis-dependent phase. Thus, as detailed
below, I propose that reconsolidation is a phase of the
overall consolidation process [12], and I will refer to the
gradient of postretrieval fragility as the consolidation
gradient. Several other studies reported outcomes that are
in agreement with ours. Litvin and Anokin [28] found that
in chicks intracerebral administration of the protein synthe-
sis inhibitor cycloheximide 5 min before a passive
avoidance reminder procedure, which was performed 2,
24, or 48 h after training, resulted in temporary amnesia
that gradually decreased in duration as the interval between
training and reminding increased. The authors concluded
that: “quenching of the ability of protein synthesis inhibition
during the reminder to disrupt memory demonstrates the
existence of a gradual process resulting in consolidation of
memory between 2 and 48 h of learning”. Eisenberg and
Dudai [29] also reported that with respect to Medaka fish
fear memories, administration of a Na+ channel blocker
upon reactivation disrupts a 4-day-old memory, but has no
effect on a 15-day-old one and has an intermediate effect on
a 9-day-old memory. Additional corroboration of the same
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phenomenon was provided by Suzuki et al. [30] who, using
systemic anisomycin injections in mice at time points
covering an 8-week temporal window after training,
elegantly showed that contextual fear conditioning displays
a gradient of postreactivation fragility. They found that this
fragility is a function not only of the age, but also of the
strength of the memory, as well as on the extension of the
reactivation, so that weaker memories are more easily
reconsolidated than are stronger ones. Moreover, Boccia et
al. [31] showed that in mice trained in inhibitory avoidance
the intracerebral injection (i.c.v.) injection of an inhibitor of
high-affinity choline uptake after memory retrieval led to
amnesia at later tests if the memory was reactivated either at
2, 7, or 14 days after training; however, a 30-day-old
memory that underwent the same treatment remained intact.
Frankland et al. [32] reported similar effects using brain-
region-restricted inhibition of protein synthesis. They
examined the effect of postretrieval anisomycin injections
into either the dorsal hippocampus or anterior cingulate
cortex of 1-day-old (recent) and 36-day-old (remote)
contextual fear memory in mice, finding that, in the dorsal
hippocampus, anisomycin disrupted subsequent expression
of recent but not remote memory. Similar infusions into the
anterior cingulate cortex had no effect on either recent or
remote contextual fear memories, whereas systemically
applied anisomycin blocked remote memory expression only
when long reexposure durations were used to retrieve the
memory. The dissociation between the effects of systemically
and centrally administered anisomycin on remote memory led
the authors to suggest that memory stability is due, in part, to
the distributed nature of remote contextual fear memory traces.
Different interpretations and conclusions have been offered
by Nader’s group. These authors reported that 2-day- and 2-
week-old memories of cued-fear conditioning in rats were
disrupted by postretrieval bilateral injections of anisomycin
into the amygdala [14]. In addition, they found that in
contrast to what has been shown by Frankland et al. [32]
who used the same contextual fear conditioning task,
post-recall anisomycin injection into the dorsal hippocampi
of rats disrupts a 45-day-old memory, a time when
contextual memory is independent of the hippocampus
[33]. Nader’s group argues that retrieval-induced memory
lability applies to remote memories and that “contextual
memories associated with shock always seem to be able to
return to a labile state after reactivation” [24, 33]. In my
view, this conclusion may be premature. In agreement with
the aforementioned literature, and consistent with the
conclusions of Suzuki et al. [30], a reasonable explanation
for Nader’s results is that the temporal profile of the
reconsolidation gradient is a function of several parameters,
including strength of the original memory, strength of the
reactivation protocol, and the passage of time. I would add to
this list one more parameter, the nature of the task. All these
aspects likely contribute to the degree and duration of the
postreactivation gradient of fragility. Hence, under the
experimental conditions used by Nader’s group (e.g., the
reactivation time points chosen), the memory may still lie
within the labile period. Moreover, it will not be inconsistent
with the consolidation gradient results that, under certain
circumstances, the stabilization process that occurs over time
may never reach a plateau and some memories may remain
sensitive to postretrieval interference for a very long time,
even indefinitely. Interestingly, for example, memories that
require multiple training trials to consolidate appear to show
a long-lasting temporal window of postreactivation fragility.
Diergaarde et al. [34] reported that a 21-day-old appetitive
instrumental response (sucrose self-administration) is dis-
rupted by systemic injection of the β-adrenergic antagonist
propranolol. Moreover, Lee et al. [35] showed that a
27-days-old cocaine-induced conditioned place preference
is disrupted by postreactivation amygdala injections of
zif268 antisense. In my opinion, a possible explanation for
these results is that the consolidation gradient of these
multiple-training trial-induced memories is a function of the
number, frequency, and intensity of training trials, and that
the protocol used in the studies described above produced
memories that were not yet not fully consolidated at the
chosen testing times. This hypothesis is testable and further
studies should be able to address this point.
An important point that I would like to stress for the
purpose of clarity is that the existence of a gradient does not
necessarily mean that a remote memory, insensitive to
protein synthesis inhibition after retrieval, does not undergo
“reactivation-induced” changes. Rather, postreactivation
changes occur without manifested fragility of the consoli-
dated information. This view would agree with the idea that
memory stability correlates with the distributed nature of
the memory trace [36].
Hence, based on the consolidation gradient results, how
do we explain memory reconsolidation?
Classical theory of memory consolidation versus theory
of memory reconsolidation As mentioned earlier, one point
overlooked by the classical theory of memory consolidation
is that a memory could undergo rounds of “consolidation”
after reminders of the learned event. The classical view
regarded memory consolidation as a unitary process. On the
other hand, the reconsolidation hypothesis suggested that
whenever memory undergoes reactivation it becomes labile
[9, 24]. However, this hypothesis, as described above, has
also failed.
Although it is important to gain further understanding of
the reconsolidation process before affirming what it
signifies, for the sake of debate, I would like to propose a
hypothetical model that explains the function of memory
reconsolidation. It is known that facts and events become
Debates in Neuroscience (2007) 1:17–24 19
long-lasting memories if they are salient. Experimentally, it
has been shown that modulatory inputs can make memory
traces stronger as well as weaker [37]. These inputs appear
to be intimately associated with systems that convey the
importance of the experienced event. Interestingly, phar-
macological treatment can often be substituted for practice
to strengthen the memory trace, suggesting that a drug or
practice activates a common mechanism [38]. There is
obviously a gradient of salience among different experi-
ences and, at one end, there are, for example, traumatic and
aversive events. These types of events are generally
remembered for a very long time, often a lifetime. Do we
need to reexperience September 11 to remember it?
Obviously not, and such a retraining event would represent
an additional life-threat that the principle of conservation of
our biological nature has evolved to avoid. How, then, do
we memorize a one-trial learning experience for a long
time? I propose that this occurs through reconsolidation
processes induced by recall, which, by safely reactivating
the trace of the aversive training event, increasingly
stabilizes memory, similar to what multiple training trials
are required to do to stabilize the memory of emotionally
neutral events. I propose that the degree of salience (and
therefore the evoked arousal and modulation) of learned
events correlates with the frequency of memory reactivation
(implicit and explicit) and therefore with the profile of the
consolidation gradients and the strength and duration of the
memories. According to this view, whereas other types of
memory (e.g., procedural) consolidate through many
repetitions of trials, a one-time aversive (or emotionally
charged) learning would consolidate into a long-lasting
memory by repeatedly recalling and reactivating the
original experience (implicit and explicit recollections)
and, consequently, all the sequelae of underlying molecular
reconsolidation changes, until the memory becomes stable.
Thus, memory reactivation produces a process of reconso-
lidation to stabilize or consolidate the memory. In other
words, reconsolidation is likely a phase of the overall
consolidation process [12].
Accordingly, reactivation might also be used to mediate
the maintenance of the memory over time; that is, to
prevent forgetting. In these instances, the memory, or the
parts of the memory that become reactivated upon the urge
of present experiences, by undergoing reconsolidation,
would prolong the storage of the information that is
reactivated.
Procedural constraints: what is it that needs to be
reactivated to produce memory fragility? Virtually nothing
is known about this important issue. In my view, important
and testable questions exist that may help us understand
why there is a gradient of increasing resistance to post-
reactivation memory disruption. First, is it the ratio between
the extent of the reactivated memory trace versus the extent
of the consolidated trace that makes a memory sensitive to
disruption? Or is it the nature of the reactivated representa-
tions that have different valences? Finally, do the intrinsic
characteristics of the trace change over time?
Although the answers to these questions are not yet
available, several studies have provided interesting relevant
information. In line with the results of Suzuki et al. [30] and
Frankland et al. [32], a “stronger” reactivation makes a
memory labile, whereas a weaker reactivation of the same
memory is ineffective, suggesting that memory stability
may be caused, in part, by the distributed nature of the
memory trace and the extent of the reactivated trace [32,
36]. In addition, training trials are effective as reactivation
procedures [39–45] in inducing reconsolidation, whereas
recall procedures represented by the conditioned stimulus
(CS) alone are sometimes ineffective [42, 46, 47]. Finally,
only directly reactivated memories, not indirectly reacti-
vated ones, undergo reconsolidation in the amygdala [48].
What is the function of memory reconsolidation? Why do
memories become labile after reactivation? Two nonmu-
tually exclusive hypotheses have been proposed to address
this question: (1) retrieval strengthens memory retention
[13], and (2) retrieval triggers a reconsolidation process that
allows the integration of new information into the back-
ground of the past (memory updating). In other words,
reconsolidation allows us “to associate new learning with
already established and reactivated memories” [9, 11, 49].
As described above, the first is the hypothesis that I
strongly endorse as a functional explanation for the role of
reconsolidation. Although the literature is rich with sugges-
tions supporting the idea that memory reactivation increases
memory strength and prevents forgetting, to my knowledge,
no systematic study addressing this issue has yet been
provided. However, supporting evidence include, for
example, a recent finding by Parvez et al. [50] showing
that memory reactivation through the reexperience of a
single contingent-reinforcing stimulus given in the same
context as previous intermediate-term memory training
boosts a residual memory trace into long-term memory. In
addition, electrical stimulation of the mesencephalic retic-
ular formation (MRF) improves the retention of memories,
including fear conditioning and linear maze, when the
stimulus is applied after reactivation [13, 51]. Finally, clear
evidence has recently shown that during the reconsolidation
phase memory retention can be increased by pharmacolog-
ical modulation [52, 53], suggesting that after reactivation
memory can be strengthened.
Regarding the second hypothesis, my laboratory has
attempted to address the question of whether the reconso-
lidation process is used to mediate the formation of
associations between new and reactivated information by
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using second-order conditioning [27]. This procedure
occurs in a two-step paradigm. First, a conditioned stimulus
(CS1) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US). Then
the established properties of CS1 are paired with a new
stimulus, CS2, producing a CS1–CS2 association [54].
Thus, using the inhibitory avoidance (IA) task, we first
established the formation of an IA fear memory for a
context A (CS1) using a footshock (US). We subsequently
presented a neutral cue originally present in context A
(CS1) in a new context, B (CS2), and showed that animals
develop IA in context B, although this context has never
been paired with a shock. Using systemic inhibition of
protein synthesis, we observed that both the new associa-
tion (CS2–CS1) and the recalled memory (CS2-US) are
labile after reactivation of the original memory, which
occurs while the new association is formed. However, using
region-restricted molecular disruption, we found that the
reconsolidation of the original memory takes place inde-
pendently from the formation of the new association. In
fact, the two processes are mechanistically distinct because
they are doubly dissociable: the inhibition of a molecular
mechanism required for memory reconsolidation, namely,
the expression of C/EBPβ in the amygdala, selectively
disrupts the reactivated memory while leaving the new
association intact. Conversely, the formation of the new
association is mediated by molecular mechanisms similar to
those underlying the initial consolidation of a new memory.
Indeed, hippocampal inhibition of protein synthesis or C/
EBPβ expression, which selectively disrupts the consoli-
dation of new IA memories, impairs the retention of the
new association, but leaves the old memory intact. Thus,
although the process of retrieving a memory is necessary
for linking new information with reactivated memories, the
retrieval-induced reconsolidation process is not engaged in
linking the new information with the reactivated memory.
A study by Rodriguez-Ortiz et al. [45] investigated
memory updating from a different angle and using a
different task, that is, attenuation of neophobia (AN) in
rats. AN is represented by a gradual increase in tastant
intake after repeated presentations of the same tastant.
Repeated learning presentations of the tastant were used to
test the relationship between the new learning event and the
consolidated memory established by previous trials as well
as the fragility of both new and previously established
memories. The authors referred to each additional learning
as memory updating. Using multiple training trials, each
separated by 24 h, they found that infusion of anisomycin
into the insular cortex after the first, second, or third trial
significantly disrupted memory retention; however, the
disruption observed after the third trial was only partial.
On the other hand, anisomycin injected after six trials had
no significant effect. Thus, they concluded that, whereas
additional learning is acquired, part of the older, consoli-
dated memory in the insular cortex becomes independent of
protein synthesis. Furthermore, rats that after seven trials of
attenuation of neophobia underwent training in conditioned
taste aversion (CTA) for the same taste in the presence of
anisomycin developed amnesia for CTA the following day.
The authors concluded that “protein synthesis is required to
update previously consolidated memory trace regardless of
the valence of the tastant.” This study, in agreement with
our results, indicates that the formation of the new
association linked to a previously established memory
requires protein synthesis. However, it did not determine
whether it is the protein synthesis required for the
reconsolidation of the old memory that is recruited to
mediate the incorporation of new information. Thus, in line
with what is suggested by our results, it is possible that this
type of memory updating also recruits a consolidation-like
process and not the reconsolidation of the original memory.
Indeed, consistent with our findings, the study by Rodri-
guez-Ortiz et al. [45] shows that the old and new memories
are dissociable processes because, whereas the old memory
can become insensitive to disruption (consolidated), the
incorporation of the new information (or updating, as
referred to by the author) remains sensitive to disruption.
The distinction between reconsolidation of an original
memory and making a new association between new and
reactivated information is an important one. Our studies
indicate that they are distinct because they can be
experimentally doubly dissociated and that linking new
and reactivated information is not memory reconsolidation,
but rather the formation of a new memory. This point
should be kept in mind when discussing results such as the
one above by Rodriguez-Ortiz et al. [45] and those of Lee et
al. [55] who examined the effect of memory reactivation on
the formation of new associations and referred to this as
reconsolidation. Lee et al. [55] showed that the infusion of
zif268 antisense oligodeoxynucleotides into the basolateral
amygdala before the reactivation of a well-learned memory for
a CS–cocaine association abolishes the acquisition of a new
instrumental cocaine-seeking response.
In conclusion, I propose that memory updating is a
process similar to the consolidation of a new memory and
distinct from the reconsolidation of established memories.
Disrupting reconsolidation: an impairment of memory
stabilization or retrieval? One of the oldest and still
unresolved problems of postconsolidation and postreconso-
lidation amnesia is whether they represent retrieval or
storage deficits [24, 49, 56–60]. Is memory disruption after
retrieval an elimination of the physical trace of the memory
or is it a reduction of its expression? Two criteria are often
used to dissect these questions: the exposure to reminder
stimuli and testing for the persistence of amnesia. In both
cases, the recovery of memory argues in favor of retrieval
Debates in Neuroscience (2007) 1:17–24 21
deficits. Thus far, the published results, and therefore the
conclusions, have been mixed. In several cases it has been
reported that the memory deficits observed after the
administration of interfering agents or events after retrieval
were transient and that memory resumed after some time (e.g.,
[57, 61–63]). Moreover, in some cases the experience of a
reminder event readily recovered the memory (e.g., [64]). In
contrast, a number of other studies have shown that the
amnesia produced by postretrieval treatments is persistent (e.
g., [30, 33, 42, 43, 46, 65–68]). In many cases, the
experience of a reminder has failed to restore memory
retention (e.g. [43, 46, 67, 68]), suggesting that, at least in
some circumstances, memory disruption may reflect a
weakening of the stored trace.
Several authors seem to agree that the amnesia caused by
postreactivation interference is a retrieval deficit [57, 58, 69].
However, I would argue that, in favor of the consolidation
deficit view, it is possible that, at least in some cases, the
evidence for a retrieval deficit emerges when, because of the
protocols used to reactivate the memory, (i.e., duration of CS
exposure), an accelerated extinction rather than a block in
reconsolidation has been evoked [70–72].
Although, we never targeted this issue in our studies, for
the sake of discussion, I direct attention to two of our
results, which seem to argue for a loss of consolidated or
consolidating information rather than a retrieval deficit. The
first addresses an explanation for the observed age-related
gradient of amnesia. We found that a 2-day-old IA
reactivated memory is disrupted by protein synthesis
inhibition, whereas one that is 2 weeks old is not. How can
we explain these results as retrieval impairment? Is the
retrieval process different for memories of different ages? Or,
on the contrary, is it the memory trace that changes over time
and, while unretrievable at 2 days, becomes retrievable at
2 weeks? If the latter is true, what is it about the intrinsic
nature of the memory that changes over time and becomes
unretrievable after interfering treatments? And, does this not
remind us of a time-dependent consolidation process?
The second result originated from the second-order IA
conditioning studies [28] described earlier. The rats that
underwent training for context A (CS1-US) and then
memory reactivation in context B and, in this context,
formed a new association with the previous memory (CS1–
CS2), showed amnesia for the context B after hippocampal
disruption of either protein synthesis or C/EBPβ. However,
at the same time, the old memory for context A was
unaffected by the same treatment and was, in fact, normally
retrieved. Conversely, C/EBPβ disruption in the amygdala
resulted in amnesia of the original memory for context A
but left the retrieval of memory for context B intact.
Because the retention of only one memory (IA for one
context) and not the other similar one was reciprocally
affected, these findings suggest that the retrieval apparatus
is intact, supporting the idea that the selective amnesia of
one memory might be caused by a storage deficit.
In conclusion, although several authors support the idea
of retrieval deficit to explain amnesia caused by reconso-
lidation interference, several results argue against this, and
further investigation is required to settle this issue.
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